

~~SECRET~~Document No. _____
Review of this document by CIA has
determined thatIMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE
OF APRIL 4, 1951, ESTABLISHING A
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARDCIA has no objection to declass
if it contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S C
Authority: HR 70-2
☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest
Date 28 JUNE 82 Reviewer 103430

It has been remarked by many individuals who have studied the Presidential directive establishing a National Psychological Strategy Board that the manner in which it is implemented will depend largely on the point of view of members of the Board, but even more on the conception adopted by the Board's full-time Staff Director. Any proposal as to the manner in which the directive should be implemented, therefore, must be in the nature of a personal opinion. This one is no exception, and embodies only one of several points of view which the Board members and Staff Director might find appropriate.

The directive can be interpreted to mean simply the Board should see to it that the available instrumentalities are used to give the United States a psychological warfare program of the greatest possible effectiveness.

In view of the comparatively small amount of time which Board members will be able to devote to this work, the principal load will fall on the Director and staff. The Director must be counted upon to provide the principal motive force, and functions of the members of the Board with respect to him will be twofold: (a) to review and approve or disapprove his recommendations for action, and (b) to provide through their respective Departments and agencies, as well as through the prestige which they command, the authority he will need to carry out approved recommendations. In the last analysis, therefore, the task of implementing the Presidential directive will fall upon the Director and his staff.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

The Director and his staff occupy a unique position in that through the Board they can influence the processes of government at a very high level, and they are not saddled with specific routine duties. At the same time, they are specifically enjoined against attempting to build a new agency, and they are directed to use existing facilities to the maximum extent possible. Consequently, they are in a position to devote more time to creative thinking than is customary in bureaucratic structures. In this lies their greatest strength. If they allow themselves to rely upon ideas generated at lower levels and to become merely a review body, then their contribution to U. S. psychological warfare will be small.

The Director, then, might quite legitimately resist any effort to involve his staff in specific projects at an early date. Instead, he might start by making a thorough review of psychological warfare and related activities as they now exist or are planned within the government. This review would include not only a review^{of} current reports and interviews with their principal personnel, but also a study of basic documents going back approximately a decade: the PWD, SHAEF history, the OWI history, the MacMahon report, and the reports of numerous investigations of the State Department foreign information program.

As a result of this survey, the Director will be able to define a large number of problems the solution of which will contribute to the national psychological effort. Some of them will be small and specific; others will be large and general. All of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

All of the former type of problems, and as many as possible of the latter type the Director (with the approval of the Board) will want to refer to other agencies for a solution. The role of the Director and his staff will be that of following through to make sure that solutions are found and of providing advice and assistance in the event that difficulties are encountered. Examples of relatively small and specific problems might be: lack of sufficient personnel to handle work load; absence of appropriate channels; absence of necessary information due to lack of coordination.

With respect to less clearly defined problem areas, the Director and his staff may find it necessary to analyze the factors involved, refer some aspects of the problem to other agencies or lower echelons, and retain other aspects for action by the staff itself. The following are some of the broadest problems with which the Board may become concerned:

1. Formulation of national objectives in such a manner that the formulations will be more useful for propaganda purposes.
2. Creations of conditions which will make it possible for government to attract and retain the services of the best qualified personnel for propaganda and psychological warfare.
3. Coordination of public information activities of governmental agencies with propaganda and psychological warfare activities.


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

Ultimately, of course, a two-way flow between the PSB and lower echelons will develop - PSB referring to lower echelons those problems which they are competent to solve, and lower echelons referring to PSB those problems which lie beyond their competence. At the outset, however, PSB would be most unwise to allow itself and its staff to become snowed under with problems referred from below. This would tend merely to involve the new Board in activities for which it is not yet "tooled up," and would tend to negate the sense of the Presidential directive in that it would make it difficult at the outset to obtain a comprehensive view of government psychological warfare activities. The initial flow should be from the new Board to existing agencies and to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Board.

In addition to the Director, the professional staff of the PSB might be constituted along the following lines:

- 
1. Deputy Staff Director
 - 2 Military specialists
 - 1 Covert activities specialist
 - 2 Political specialists
 - 1 Economic specialist
 - 1 Intelligence and evaluation specialist

Recruitment of a really competent staff of this type will be a matter of several months, but until it is recruited, effective implementation of the Presidential directive will not be possible. Furthermore, most individuals who become staff members will require approximately six weeks or more before they are able to perform the type of duties expected of them. It would be unrealistic to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

expect, therefore, that full-scale operation of the PSB will be possible prior to September, 1951.

During the next four months period, therefore, the existing Psychological Operations Coordinating Board should endeavor to fill the gap insofar as possible and perform such staff work as it can on behalf of the new PSB.

~~SECRET~~

4/30/51